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KOSOVO: 
TO BOMB OR NOT TO BOMB? 
THE LEGALITY IS THE QUESTION 
LESLIE A. BURTON * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1998 and 1999, Yugoslavia was engaged in an "ethnic cleansing," 
involving the systematic murder of its ethnic minorities, especially 
within its state of Kosovo. 1 Although the United Nations issued 
Resolutions condemning Yugoslavia's actions,2 the U.N. stopped short of 
ordering any enforcement action. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") members agreed that 
action must be taken to stop the slaughter. 3 After attempts to negotiate 
peace in the region proved unsuccessful, NATO determined that an 
aggressive response was the only altemative.4 On March 24, 1999, 
NATO-sponsored forces commenced bombing Kosovo.5 The bombing 
ended on June 10, 1999,6 having achieved its aim. 
* Lecturer, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, California. LL.M. candi-
date, Golden Gate University School of Law; BA, magna cum laude, University of Portland; JD, 
cum laude, Santa Clara Law School. 
1. Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Operation Allied Force: Reviewing the Lawfulness of NATO's Use 
of Military Force to Defend Kosovo, 23 MD. J.INT'L L. & TRADE 295, 296-307 (1999). 
2. See infra notes 13, 14, and 15. 
3. Sharp, supra note 1, at 303. 
4. Id. 
5. Thomas D. Grant, Extending Decolonization: How the United Nations Might Have Ad-
dressed Kosovo, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 9, 15 (2000); Tina Rosenburg, A Bad Year for the 
World's Border Guards: Editorial, N.Y. TiMES, July 2, 1999, at A. 
6. Laura Geissler, The Law of Humanitarian Intervention and the Kosovo Crisis, 23 HAMLINE 
L. REV. 323, 336 (2000). 
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The subject of this paper is whether NATO's actions were legal under 
international law. 
Some scholars have maintained that the bombing was illegal in the sense 
that its scope was too broad; e.g. that the types of weapons (such as 
cluster bombs) were too indiscriminate; or that the targets were illegal 
(some claim that the bombing targeted civilians and in some cases killed 
the very refugees whom NATO was seeking to protect).? These 
arguments are beyond the scope of this paper, which will address only 
whether the decision to commence bombing was itself lawful under 
international law. 
II. SOURCES OF AUTHORITY 
Only two sources could have authorized NATO to use force against a 
sovereign nation. The first source would have been the United Nations 
Charter. The second source would have been customary international 
law. Each of these will be examined separately. 
A. THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AS AUTHORITY FOR THE USE OF 
FORCE 
The United Nations Charter specifically recognizes the existence of 
regional organizations, such as NATO, and allows regional organizations 
to deal with matters of international peace and security, so long as these 
activities are "consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations."g 
In the NATO Treaty, the member countries agreed that NATO would not 
use force in "any manner inconsistent with the United Nations 
purposes.,,9 
Several provisions of the United Nations Charter specifically authorize 
the use of force against a sovereign nation. The question then becomes 
whether NATO's use of force was authorized by any of the provisions of 
the United Nations Charter. 
7. Julie Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from 
Kosovo, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1743, 1781-87 (2000). 
8. V.N. CHARTER art. 52(1). 
9. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 1,63 Stat. 2241, 34 V.N.T.S. 243, 244. 
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1. Security Council Can Approve Use of Armed Force to Maintain 
International Peace 
The United Nations Security Council may approve the use of force under 
the provisions of articles 39 and 42 of the United Nations Charter. First, 
the Security Council must determine that a "breach of the peace or act of 
aggression" has occurred. 1O If the Council makes that determination, 
then it may impose economic and other sanctions (such as severing 
diplomatic relations) which do not involve armed force. II If the Council 
finds that these measures would be inadequate, it may authorize the use 
of armed force as is necessary to "maintain or restore international peace 
and security.,,12 
The Security Council did determine, under article 39, that Yugoslavia 
was breaching the peace by its treatment of its ethnic minorities. In 
Security Council Resolution 1160, issued in March 1998, it called for a 
cessation of hostilities in the area and imposed an arms embargo. 13 
When Yugoslavia refused to obey the resolution, the Security Council in 
September 1998 issued Resolution 1199, which referred to an 
"impending humanitarian catastrophe" in Yugoslavia and called for a 
cease fire and a political dialog. 14 Yugoslavia again failed to heed the 
resolutions. Yet another resolution, 1203, was passed in October 1998. 
This one endorsed a cease fire which had been negotiated (but proved to 
be short-lived) and condemned all acts of violence and terrorism. 15 
None of the resolutions authorized even the lesser sanctions of article 41, 
let alone the use of force under article 42.16 In fact, such an authorization 
would have been impossible to obtain because it needed the votes of all 
five permanent members of the Security Council,17 but at least two of 
them (China and Russia) would not have consented.18 
10. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. 
II. [d. at art. 41. 
12. [d. at art. 42. 
13. U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3868th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES.1160 (1998). 
14. U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3930th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES.1199 (1998). 
15. U.N. SCOR, 53d superrd Sess., 3937th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES.1203 (1998). 
16. Grant, supra note 5, at 19. 
17. U.N. Charter, art. 27(3), requires that non-procedural matters be passed only with the con-
currence of all five permanent members of the Security Council. These members are: China, France, 
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. U.N. CHARTER art. 23. 
18. In fact, China, Russia, and India were the only members of the Security Council to vote to 
condemn the bombings. Aaron Schwabach, The Legality of the NATO Bombing Operation in the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 11 PACE INT'L L.R. 405, 416 (1999), citing Law and Right, When 
They Don't Fit Together, THE ECONOMIST, April 3, 1999, at 19-20. 
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The United States, through Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, took 
the position that the Security Council, by issuing these Resolutions, had 
authorized the use of armed force in KoSOVO.19 This contention is 
without merit. Nothing in the Charter makes an article 39 resolution into 
a self-executing article 42 resolution. States cannot infer that they have 
Security Council approval to use armed force to enforce all Security 
Council resolutions.20 Further, after the bombing had commenced, 
Secretary-General Annan reprimanded NATO, stating that it should not 
have acted without Security Council authorization,21 offering further 
proof that there was no Security Council approval. No authority exists 
for the U.S. position, which was roundly dismissed by international law 
scholars.22 
. Finally, regional organizations do not have any greater right to use force 
than the United Nations does. Under article 53, regional organizations 
cannot use force without the approval of the Security Council.23 NATO 
did not have Security Council approval and its use of force was not 
authorized under these provisions. 
2. The U.N. Charter Authorizes Individual, Collective, and 
Anticipatory Self-Defense 
Even without Security Council approval, however, it seems that regional 
organizations may legitimately use force in self-defense under article 51. 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter allows nations to use armed 
force for self-defense, or defense of others, when attacked. That article 
states that "nothing in the . . . Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations .... ,,24 Article 5 of the NATO Treaty 
similarly allows NATO to use force in self defense against an "armed 
attack.,,25 If Yugoslavia had attacked another nation, these articles would 
have authorized the victimized nation and its allies to respond with 
armed force. 
19. Sharp, supra note 1, at 318-19; Grant, supra note 5, at 19. 
20. Sharp, supra note 1, at 323-24. 
21. Klinton W. Alexander, NATO'S Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Case for Violating 
Yugoslavia's National Sovereignty in the Absence of Security Council Approval, 22 Hous. J. INT'L 
L. 403, 436 (2000), citing Judith Miller, The Secretary General Offers Implicit Endorsement of 
Raids, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at A1. 
22. Grant, supra note 5, at 19. 
23. U.N. CHARTER art. 53. 
24. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
25. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5, 34 U.N.T.S. at 246. 
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The problem with using these articles as justification for the NATO 
bombing is that Yugoslavia made no attack against a member of the 
United Nations, or indeed even against any other nation. Yugoslavia's 
actions were entirely within its own borders, against its own citizens. As 
horrendous as Yugoslavia's acts against its own citizens were, they were 
not grounds for an armed response under any provisions of the United 
Nations Charter. To the contrary, article 2(7) of the Charter provides that 
"Nothing ... in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which essentially are within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state .... ,,26 
Yugoslavia's argument, therefore, is that no other nation may act, 
especially with force, when Yugoslavia applies its own domestic policies 
to its own peoples. This argument is well-grounded in the language of 
the Charter. 
The opposing argument asserts that Yugoslavia is a "threatening 
presence" in the area, and that this threat gives rise to a claim of 
collective self-defense?? Under this position, Yugoslavia's actions 
threaten other nations, not only because refugees from Yugoslavia pour 
into neighboring nations to escape the massacres in Yugoslavia, but also 
because the strong anti-minority sentiment in Yugoslavia may have 
dangerous effects on those minorities who live in neighboring nations?8 
Further, Yugoslavia's prior actions, such as its attack against Croatia and 
Slovenia and its support for the Serbians in the Bosnian civil war, were 
aimed at expanding its borders over neighboring states with Serbian 
populations?9 Thus states bordering Yugoslavia had reason to see 
Yugoslavia as a threatening presence in the area.3D 
The NATO members, however, were not among the nations arguably 
threatened. None of them bordered Kosovo, and only one member 
(Hungary) bordered Yugoslavia.31 
Further, the existence of a "threatening presence" does not justify the use 
of force under the plain language of Article 51. Force may be used only 
in response to an "armed attack." 
26. U.N. Charter art. 2(7). 
27. Schwabach, supra note 18, at 409. 
28. [d. at 409, 411. 
29. [d. at 409. 
30. [d. 
31. Schwabach, supra note 18, at 409. 
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But some commentators have argued that self-defense includes 
"anticipatory collective self-defense." In other words, a group of nations 
should not have to sit back and wait until an attack on one of them 
actually occurs if an attack is imminent. 
Commentators . advocating an anticipatory collective self-defense 
argument have used a six-prong test to determine whether self-defense is 
justified. The prongs are: (1) the use of force is proportional, (2) the use 
of force is necessary, (3) the threat is instant, (4) the threat is 
overwhelming, (5) there is no peaceful alternative, and (6) there is no 
time for deliberation.32 
This test fails here. Let us assume arguendo that the first four prongs 
were met: the use of force was proportional to the perceived risk, the use 
of force was necessary to prevent serious harm, the threat was immediate 
and ongoing. But the last tow elements were not satisfied. First, other 
alternatives existed to bombing Kosovo, such as economic sanctions or 
the sending of peace-keeping forces. Further, NATO contemplated 
taking action for months before deciding to bomb,33 thus giving the lie to 
the argument that no time for deliberation existed. Thus, the NATO 
bombing was not justified by a theory of "anticipatory self-defense," at 
least under the United Nations Charter. . 
Nor can NATO argue that its attack was justified as an enforcement 
technique, as opposed to an act of self-defense. A regional organization 
cannot use force as an enforcement technique unless it first obtains 
authorization from the Security Council.34 
The NATO bombing of Kosovo was not authorized under the specific 
provisions of the United Nations Charter. Therefore we must examine 
whether it can be justified under customary international law. 
B. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AUTHORITY FOR 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
The use of force may sometimes be authorized, under customary 
international law, to protect people from genocide and other human 
rights abuses. Such a power, however, must be carefully delineated and 
limited. 
32. [d. 
33. [d. 
34. U.N. CHARTER art. 53(1). 
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1. The Use of Force to Prevent Genocide. 
The U.N. Charter does not state that its provisions are the only possible 
authority for using force. In fact the U.N. Charter states that regional 
organizations may deal with "matters relating to the maintenance of 
[regional] international peace and security" so long as the organization's 
actions are "consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations.,,35 Thus, the use of force, although not authorized by a specific 
provision of the U.N. Charter, may be lawful if it is not inconsistent with 
United Nations purposes and is otherwise lawful--in other words, if it 
conforms to customary international law. 
When a practice is generally accepted, it begins to form a part of 
customary internationallaw.36 A custom has been developing in recent 
years whereby nations may use force to intervene to prevent human 
rights abuses and genocide within the boundaries of other separate 
sovereign nations?7 Thus, even though the use of force is not explicitly 
authorized by the U.N. Charter, it may be authorized by customary 
international law . 
Using force to protect people from genocide suffered at the hands of their 
own government is not inconsistent with the U.N. Charter or the 
purposes of the United Nations. In fact, humanitarian intervention is 
consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
Many believe that the formation of the United Nations, on the heels of 
the Nazi atrocities of World War II, was the starting place for the modem 
position favoring humanitarian intervention?8 
This argument finds support in the very Preamble to the U.N. Charter, 
which states that one of the Charter's purposes is to "reaffIrm faith in 
fundamental human rights .... ,,39 
Article 1 (3) goes on to emphasize that the Charter seeks to achieve 
international cooperation in "promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all .... ,,40 
35. U.N. CHARTER art. 52(1). 
36. Geissler, supra note 6. at 329, citing IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE USE 
OF FORCE BY STATES 6-7 (1963). 
37. Sharp, supra note I, at 313. 
38. Id. at 315-316 n.156 and accompanying text. 
39. U.N. CHARTER Preamble. 
40. Id. at art. 1(3). 
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Article 55 states that 
the United Nations shall promote: ... universal respect 
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all .... 41 
Article 56 requires that 
[a]ll members pledge themselves to take joint and 
separate action in cooperation with the Organization for 
the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 
55.42 
These provlSlons indicate that humanitarian purposes are one of the 
primary goals of the Charter. Because humanitarian concerns are at the 
very heart of the Charter, the Charter provides a basis for humanitarian 
intervention. 
Scholar Jordan Paust argued that the intervention in Kosovo promoted 
the purposes of the United Nations.43 He stated that the intervention 
served the general purposes of the United Nations listed in Article 1 of 
the Charter which include the preservation of peace, security, self-
determination of peoples, and respect for and observance of human 
rights.44 
He added that the action was legal under Articles 55 and 56 be-cause all 
member states are required to take joint and separate action for the 
universal respect for and observance of human rights. .. [including to] 
prevent and punish ... [genocide].45 
Further support for humanitarian intervention is found in the Genocide 
Convention of 1948,46 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948,47 and the Geneva Conventions of 194948. 
41. Id. at art. 55. 
42. Id. at art. 56. 
43. Geissler, supra note 6, at 342. 
44. Geissler, supra note 6, at 342, citing Jordan J. Paust, NATO's Use of Force in Yugoslavia, 
33 UNITED NATIONS LAW REPORTS 114, 114 (John Carey ed., May 1, 1999). 
45. Id at 342, citing Paust, supra note 44, at 115. 
46. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,78 
U.N.T.S. 277, 280 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
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The Genocide Convention in particular calls upon the United Nations to 
take such action as appropriate for "the prevention and suppression of 
acts of genocide.'.49 Acts of genocide include killing, or inflicting 
serious harm, on members of an ethnic group with an intent to destroy 
that groUp.50 The crime of genocide transcends the inviolability of 
states,51 and using force to prevent it is legal. The crime of genocide was 
occurring in Kosovo. Because NATO intervened to prevent it, NATO's 
action was legal. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights condemns the unlawful 
taking of life,52 and the Geneva Conventions prohibits the murder of 
civilians.53 These agreements encourage signatories to take action when 
a state violates the agreements' provisions.54 Yugoslavia was unlawfully 
taking lives and killing civilians. Therefore, NATO's intervention was 
legal. 
Additionally, there are several precedents for modern, post-Charter 
humanitarian intervention. In the 1970's, India intervened in Bangladesh 
to prevent appalling atrocities.55 Tanzania intervened in Uganda in 1979 
to end the barbaric rule of Idi Amin.56 In 1990, several west African 
countries intervened in Liberia to stop mass killings,57 and again in Sierra 
Leone in 1998.58 In 1991 the Allies intervened in Iraq to protect the 
47. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, reprinted in THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
READER 197-202 (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubins eds., 1989)[hereinafter Human Rights Conven-
tion]. 
4S. See generally Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (Geneva 
Convention I); Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 V.N.T.S. S5 
(Geneva Convention m; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (Geneva Convention ill); Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 
(Geneva Convention N) [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Conventions]. 
49. Genocide Convention, supra note 46, at 282. 
50. Id. 
51. Schwabach, supra note IS, at 417, citing Philip Stephens, Fighting a Just War, FiNANCIAL 
TIMES, Apr. 16, 1999, at 12. 
52. Human Rights Convention, supra note 47, at 197-202. 
53. 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 48, at 29S. 
54. Geissler, supra note 6, at 33S. 
55. Sharp, supra note I, at 315 n.152 and accompanying text, citing Law and Right, supra note 
IS, at 20. 
56. Id.; Schwabach, supra note 18, at416. 
57. Sharp, supra note I, at 315 n.152 and accompanying text, citing Law and Right, supra note 
IS, at 20. These nations included Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Togo, Benin, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, 
Chad, and Niger. 
5S. Grant, supra note 5, at 45-46. 
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Kurds.59 Although none of these actions were officially approved by the 
Security Council, the actions received widespread acceptance. The 
interventions in Uganda and Iraq, particularly, were widely accepted and 
approved.60 
Protecting human rights also was cited as part of the justification for the 
United States' sending troops to the Dominican Republic in 1961, and 
again to Grenada in 1984.61 In the latter two instances, no allegations of 
genocide were made. Rather, the circumstances were anarchy, riots, and 
political upheaval. Arguable these situations are additional grounds for 
humanitarian intervention, but are beyond the scope of this paper. 
The humanitarian interventions in Bangladesh, Uganda, Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, and Iraq support the argument that using force to protect people 
from killings and other human rights abuses has become customary 
international law. 
The idea of humanitarian intervention is not new. The first reference to 
humanitarian intervention was in 1579,62 and by the end of the nineteenth 
century most scholars believed that humanitarian intervention was 
legal.63 
In more modern times, however, the right of humanitarian intervention 
has been the subject of conflicting views. In fact, between 1900 and 
World War II, scholars assumed that the rights of sovereign nations to do 
whatever they wanted to their own citizens within their own borders was 
paramount.64 Execution and torture within a state were significant only 
59. Id.; Schwabach, supra note 18, at 416. Although the action to protect the Kurds was not 
specifically authorized by the Security Council, some argue that it was approved as a part of the war 
authorized by the Security Council to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. See Jules Lobel & Mi-
chael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease fires, 
and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 124, 124-125 (1999). However, the war had 
officially ended before the Allies acted to protect the Kurds. In any event, many U.N. members 
acquiesced in the effort to provide safe havens for the Kurds. Schwabach, supra note 18, at 416 
n.55. 
60. Sharp, supra note I, at 315 n.152 and accompanying text; Schwabach, supra note 18, at 
416. 
61. Geissler, supra note 6, at 329-31. 
62. Malvina Halberstam, The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, 3 CARDOZO J. INT'L & 
COMPo L. I, 2 (1995). 
63. Geissler, supra note 6, at 333, citing BROWNLIE, supra note 36, at 338. 
64. Sharp, supra note I, at 315, citing NATIONAL SECURITY LAw 674-75 (John Norton Moore 
et aI., eds., 1990). 
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if they were imposed upon a foreign nationa1.65 Otherwise, a state's 
internal acts could not be addressed by internationallaw.66 
But this rule has been changing.67 After World War II, both in the 
United Nations Charter and in subsequent conventions, nations agreed in 
binding treaties not to torture or kill their citizens.68 These promises, 
coupled with contemporary state practice, have combined to create a 
customary international law permitting the use of armed force to prevent 
genocide and other human rights abuses which violate international 
law.69 
Opponents of humanitarian intervention argue the traditional view, that 
the sovereignty of nations is paramount, superseding any human rights 
concerns.70 To support the continuing validity of this view, they point to 
articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the Charter. 
Article 2(4) provides that 
All members shall refrain in their international relations 
form the threat of use of force against the territorial 
integrity . . . of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.71 
Article 2(7), as discussed in section ILA.2, supra, states that the U.N. 
may not intervene in the domestic jurisdiction of any state. 
Relying on these provisions to oppose humanitarian intervention is 
misplaced. Humanitarian intervention does not violate article 2(4) 
because humanitarian actions are not directed at the territorial integrity or 
political independence of governments.72 Humanitarian intervention is 
not directed at changing territorial boundaries or the government of the 
65. Sharp, supra note I, at 315-316 n.156 and accompanying text, citing NATIONAL SECURITY 
LAW, supra note 64, at 674-75. 
66. Grant, supra note 5, at 45. 
67. Id. 
68. Sharp, supra note I, at 315, citing NATIONAL SECURITY LAw, supra note 64, at 674-75. 
69. Sharp, supra note I, at 315; Geissler, supra note 6, at 344. 
70. Geissler, supra note 6, at 335. Among the scholars opposing any right of humanitarian 
intervention is Ian Brownlie, who states that it is illegal and finds no consensus in the documents of 
the United Nations or the drafts of the International Law Commission. Id. Brownlie further states 
that any right of human intervention which existed pre-Charter would not have survived the prohibi-
tions of the Charter. Sharp, supra note 1, at 315, citing BROWNLIE, supra note 36, at 342. 
71. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4). 
72. Geissler, supra note 6, at 327. 
11
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target country.73 The use of force in Kosovo, for example, was not 
intended to topple the government. Instead, the purpose of humanitarian 
intervention is to protect people from human rights abuses.74 
Additionally, humanitarian interventions do not violate article 2(7). As 
human rights have gained acceptance, the notion of state sovereignty has 
lost ground.75 Human rights issues are no longer considered purely 
domestic issues.76 Genocide is no longer considered a local matter, but a 
breach of the international peace.77 
A minority of international scholars argue that humanitarian intervention 
is not legal. In addition to relying on the United Nations Charter 
provisions discussed above, they point to the opposition of China, India, 
and Russia to the NATO bombings. They argue that the "wide 
acceptance" necessary for a practice to become customary international 
law cannot occur when three of the world's four most populous counties 
reject the practice.78 
However, all nineteen member countries of NATO supported the 
bombing, and many other nations supported it as well.79 When China, 
India, and Russia introduced a resolution to condemn NATO, the other 
twelve members voted it down.8o This indicates the implicit acceptance 
of the great majority of Security Council members that the NATO 
bombing was lawful.81 
Enforcement actions in the United Nations historically have been 
hindered by the permanent member veto power.82 The perpetual 
disagreements of these members should not prevent an emerging norm 
from being considered as customary international law . In fact, the better 
argument is that widespread acceptance of the NATO action83 indicates 
acceptance of the use of force in humanitarian interventions, especially 
73. Id. at 337. 
74. Id. 
75. Julie Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from 
Kosovo, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1743, 1772 (2000). 
76. Id. 
77. Geissler, supra note 6, at 327,337. 
78. Schwabach, supra note 18, at 417. 
79. Geissler, supra note 6, at 338. 
80. Sharp, supra note I, at 321-22. 
81. Id. at 322. 
82. Mertus, supra note 75, at 1777. 
83. The NATO action was specifically approved by nineteen NATO members, all of which 
were also members of the United Nations. In addition, several other nations voiced their approval of 
the NATO action. Geissler, supra note 36, at 338. 
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considering that three permanent members of the Security Council (the 
U.S., France, and the U.K.) were NATO members which voted in favor 
of the bombing. 
U sing force to prevent genocide and other human rights abuses, 
therefore, is not only consistent with the purposes of the United Nations, 
it is increasingly accepted under customary international law.84 Under 
this view, the bombing of Kosovo was legal. 
2. Limitations on Humanitarian Intervention 
There are some risks in allowing humanitarian intervention. Only a few 
powerful states are in a position to use their economic and military power 
on behalf of human rights.85 Thus, the doctrine could be perverted or 
manipulated for the gain of the powerful nation.86 During the cold war 
period, for example, some states misused the doctrine as a pretext for 
occupying other states.8? 
An international consensus should be established as to humanitarian 
interventions. This could be accomplished by United Nations resolutions 
or through Conventions.88 This consensus could clarify the standards 
required for humanitarian intervention. 
Some of the criteria could include: 
(1) That the threat of immediate genocide or extreme human 
. h b . 89 ng ts a uses eXIsts. 
(2) That peaceful diplomatic efforts have failed or are unlikely 
to be effective. 
(3) That the intervening states have little or no interest in the 
affairs of the target state beyond the human rights concerns. 
(This would assure that the motives of the intervening state be 
overridingly humanitarian, rather than self-interested. 90) 
84. Sharp, supra note 1, at 325. 
85. Mertus, supra note 75, at 1778. 
86. Jd.; Geissler, supra note 6, at 333. 
87. Mertus, supra note 75, at 1778. 
88. Geissler, supra note 6, at 345. 
89. Jd. 
90. Mertus, supra note 75, at 1779-80. 
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(4) That the use of force is necessary, and the force used will be 
appropriate and will end when the goal has been accomplished. 
These criteria would assure that humanitarian interventions are just that, 
and not power grabs which would violate articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the 
Charter. 
Some commentators have suggested that humanitarian intervention occur 
only when it is requested by the target state.91 This suggestion is wholly 
impractical. First, a government which is violating the rights of its 
citizens is unlikely to request humanitarian assistance to protect its 
citizens from itself. Second, such an act would not be humanitarian 
intervention, but humanitarian assistance, an entirely different matter.92 
Perhaps the criteria should be, instead, that the victims would welcome 
the intervention.93 
If criteria such as these were established, states would have a standard by 
which to judge whether they should use force, and the international 
community would readily know whether the states who were 
"intervening" were conforming to international law . 
III. CONCLUSION 
International law scholar and professor Julie Mertus has pointed out that 
"[m]eaningful humanitarian intervention does not threaten the world 
order. Rather, it vindicates the very principles on which the United 
Nations was founded.,,94 
As an exercise of humanitarian intervention, NATO's decision to bomb 
Kosovo was justified, moral, and most of all, legal under customary 
international law.95 In the future, the United Nations should consider 
establishing specific criteria for such interventions, to prevent potential 
abuses. 
91. Geissler, supra note 6, at 333. 
92. Mertus, supra note 75, at 1779-80. 
93. [d. at 1779. 
94. Mertus, supra note 75, at 1787. 
95. The bombing itself may have gone beyond the bounds of what was justified in terms of 
who was targeted and what types of bombs were used; these details are not within the scope of this 
paper. 
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